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4.13 Network Architecture

In several engagements poor network architecture has enabled us to bypass firewalls and other controls to obtain access to the internal network. A secure network architecture should be designed to segment the internal network from the Internet and filter all traffic through a firewall (see Figure 4-1). Also, publicly accessible systems such as Web servers, DNS servers, and mail relays should be located in secure DMZs. The organizations we have found that did not follow these best practices experienced weaknesses that enabled us to obtain unauthorized access. For instance, several organizations have dual-homed hosts in the DMZ. A dual-homed host is one that has a second network card connected to another network segment and is not intended to act as a router. In these instances, the second network card was connected to the internal network. Therefore, by exploiting the dual-homed host in the DMZ we were able to access the internal network without having to penetrate the firewall. In other cases, publicly accessible systems were placed in front of the firewall with no protection. To make matters worse, administrators allowed some of these systems to communicate with internal systems through the firewall. By compromising these external systems, we were able to go through the firewall (since the rules permitted these hosts to communicate with internal systems) to internal systems. Administrators should not allow systems in DMZs to initiate communications with internal systems.

Figure 4-1. Network architecture diagram
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For instance, a DMZ system should not be allowed to FTP to an internal system. The internal system should FTP to the DMZ system. In this way, if an attacker compromises a DMZ system, he or she is less likely to be able to access the internal network.

The essential point is that network architectures need to be designed properly to enforce proper security policies. Organizations should not allow DMZ systems to be dual-homed connections to internal networks. Firewall rules should not permit external systems or DMZ systems to connect to the internal network. Chapter 20 describes network architecture in greater detail.

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